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few decades, this implies that negative 
emissions technologies, such as combined 
biofuel and carbon capture and storage, 
will have to be used during the transition. 
The second insight is greater confidence in 
mainstream estimates of global warming 
provided by a combination of research, 
observational data and models. Extreme 
estimates of warming, and catastrophic 
tipping points, while not discounted, 
seem less likely. 
The report of working group II 
on impacts and adaptation has more 
information on New Zealand than 
previous reports. It describes the 
increased risk of flood damage from 
storms, and from coastal erosion due to 
sea level rise. It has useful information on 
adaptation strategies. The working group 
III report updates mitigation options, and 
importantly confirms that the pledges 
through the United Nations climate 
change negotiations so far on the table 
are insufficient to stabilise greenhouse 
gas concentrations at the desired level. It 
also assesses the global costs of different 
mitigation pathways. It demonstrates 
The fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change, being released in sections from late 
2013 through 2014, is rekindling public interest in climate 
change. With controversies over the previous report (2007) 
out of the way, advances in knowledge since then and some 
improvement in procedures, the findings of the latest report 
appear more robust. Even though many uncertainties remain, 
the evidence base for policy is compelling. 
The report’s first instalment – from 
working group I on the physical science 
– has two highly relevant insights for 
policy. First, limiting global warming 
is at its centre a problem of cumulative 
gases (those with a long lifetime in the 
atmosphere), principally carbon dioxide 
from fossil fuels, of course, but also some 
others, including nitrous oxide, which is 
a significant proportion of New Zealand 
emissions. At some point the net emissions 
of these gases will need to approach zero. 
Unless one believes that fossil fuels can 
be eliminated completely in the next 
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that the case for early action to reduce 
emissions remains strong. 
Such insights are valuable and timely. 
They coincide with the negotiation of a 
new climate change agreement under the 
UN. This is to conclude at the end of 2015 
and to take effect from 2020. In what may 
become seen as the ‘post-Kyoto’ period, 
negotiations have the potential finally to 
produce a truly universal climate change 
regime – one where, in the language 
of the negotiations, obligations and 
commitments are ‘applicable to all’.1 The 
IPCC’s findings will help governments 
align their domestic and international 
climate change policies. 
The very slow progress of the 
international negotiations, and other 
pressures, have pushed climate change 
down the priority list for many 
governments, New Zealand being no 
exception. In New Zealand, the twin 
recoveries from the global financial 
crisis and the Canterbury earthquakes 
have meant that GDP growth and 
reducing business costs have dominated 
the government’s economic agenda. 
Doubling the value of New Zealand’s 
agricultural exports and exploring oil 
and gas resources have served these policy 
needs, and have been pursued without 
attention to climate change implications, 
perhaps because climate change measures 
may appear to serve neither goal. Climate 
change policies have accordingly been 
more or less parked. But the international 
context now again requires states to 
front up with ‘contributions’ to the 
international effort, well beyond 2020 
and more likely to 2030 (‘contributions’ 
is the new word found at Warsaw in 2013 
in lieu of the politically-charged term 
‘commitments’, in order to apply to both 
developed and developing countries). 
Pressures to increase ambition, especially 
on industrialised countries, will mean 
new attention has to be given to long-
term domestic policies, since they are the 
basis for establishing and implementing 
international commitments.  
Abroad: New Zealand and international 
climate change policies
New Zealand has historically had a 
strong voice in the UN climate change 
negotiations. It was prominent in the 
original negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, 
and New Zealand ministers and officials 
have played influential roles at climate 
change conferences since then. A high 
point of New Zealand influence was the 
2011 Durban conference, where New 
Zealand had a major role in two of the 
three key outcomes (Macey, 2012). 
There has been one recent hiccup 
in the otherwise positive story of New 
Zealand’s influence on climate change 
negotiations. Unusually, New Zealand 
entered the Doha Conference of the 
Parties in 2012 in a weak position. It 
received in return a reminder that a 
small country will get results only so long 
as it is useful to others. On emissions 
reductions, New Zealand had – and 
still has – a conditional target range to 
reduce emissions,2 dating back to 2009. 
But at Doha it was impossible to know 
how far these conditions would be met, 
and, as New Zealand had no minimum 
or unconditional target, it had nothing 
to put on the table. New Zealand could 
only say that it intended to take up a 
target under the UNFCCC – the United 
Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change – rather than the Kyoto 
Protocol, an announcement that was 
accompanied at home by a questionable 
argument that abandoning Kyoto would 
give New Zealand more influence in 
the negotiation of the new agreement. 
Apart from the fact that one could 
argue precisely the contrary, this put 
New Zealand’s immediate negotiating 
objectives at risk. 
Despite having no target, New 
Zealand sought access to the Kyoto 
market mechanisms. Economically and 
environmentally this would make sense, 
once New Zealand committed to a target. 
Developing countries would stand to 
benefit from offsets that they could 
provide under the Clean Development 
Mechanism. But politically this was always 
going to be a hard ask. Many developing 
countries saw denial of access to Kyoto 
markets as ‘punishment’ for abandoning 
Kyoto and made this plain in the early 
days of the Doha conference, as indeed 
they had earlier in the negotiations. 
New Zealand went to the Doha 
conference with nothing to offer in return 
for access to Kyoto markets: not only 
had it no target to inscribe in the annex 
of commitments (‘qelros’), but neither 
could it commit to supporting the new 
Kyoto rules it had spent years negotiating. 
So New Zealand was rebuffed. It was 
symptomatic of this loss of influence 
that, in contrast with the year before, 
New Zealand’s two ministers were almost 
invisible at this conference. 
The result was to shut New Zealand out 
of UN carbon markets from 2013,3 apart 
from wash-up accounting for the Kyoto 
Protocol’s first commitment period, which 
extends to 2015. This leaves New Zealand 
in the period after the expiry of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s first commitment period until 
the coming into effect of the new, yet 
to be negotiated agreement in potential 
limbo. It is at odds with New Zealand’s 
strong advocacy of markets in the 
negotiations, and has had consequences at 
home and abroad. Among New Zealand’s 
negotiating partners there were reactions 
of both irritation and puzzlement, all the 
more so since Australia had decided to go 
with the Kyoto Protocol and had a firm 
unconditional target. There was particular 
irritation within the EU that New Zealand 
was walking away from the rules package 
on the land sector (LULUCF: land use, 
New Zealand went to the Doha conference with 
nothing to offer in return for access to Kyoto 
markets: not only had it no target to inscribe in 
the annex of commitments ... but neither could it 
commit to supporting the new Kyoto rules ...  
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land-use change and forestry), where it 
was felt many concessions had been made 
towards New Zealand’s interests around 
plantation forestry.
The root of New Zealand’s ill-
preparedness for Doha was less the 
international policy settings per se than 
neglect of domestic policy. New Zealand 
had not done the work to establish 
an interim unconditional emissions 
reduction target, and had not decided 
which accounting rules it would adopt, 
notably on forestry. These two factors 
precluded being part of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s second commitment period, 
which, from a practical point of view, 
would have been the simplest option. 
Ironically, several months after the 
conference New Zealand came up with a 
modest unconditional 2020 target of 5% 
below 1990 levels, plus a decision to use 
the renegotiated Kyoto accounting rules. 
So, effectively New Zealand will subject 
itself to Kyoto disciplines up to 2020 
with its target, but will receive none of 
the benefits of its flexibility mechanisms. 
This potentially limits the ambition of 
New Zealand’s final 2020 commitment, if 
it is to move into the conditional range of 
10–20% below 1990 levels. 
The setback at Doha has thus had an 
impact at home, but it has not prevented 
New Zealand from working constructively 
in the international negotiations, as well 
as on other initiatives. Current themes 
that New Zealand pursues in the interna-
tional negotiations are carbon markets, 
agriculture and rules for the land sector, 
as well as the structure of the agreement 
and the form of commitments under it 
(New Zealand Government, 2013b).
Outside the UN negotiations, New 
Zealand is promoting the removal of 
inefficient subsidies on fossil fuels,4 and 
has initiated the Global Research Alliance5 
on agriculture and climate change, 
which now involves 40 countries, both 
developed and developing. New Zealand 
also set up the Asia–Pacific Carbon 
Markets Roundtable which is exploring 
the potential for a regional carbon 
market (Ministry for the Environment, 
2013b, p.215). It has joined the Climate 
and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC),6 which 
focuses on short-lived climate pollutants 
such as methane and black carbon. New 
Zealand also has a well-directed aid 
programme on climate change to help 
Pacific Island countries, with a focus on 
renewable energy. Finally, it is a tribute 
to the international reputation of climate 
change minister Tim Groser that New 
Zealand is invited to the ‘top table’ of 
the Major Economies Forum on Energy 
and Climate (MEF), a grouping of the 
world’s largest economies, and hence 
largest greenhouse gas emitters.7 It is 
self-evidently the countries in this group 
that will determine the success or failure 
of efforts to limit global greenhouse 
gas emissions, so New Zealand is in an 
excellent position to have influence. 
Such initiatives outside the UN 
are one aspect of a shift in how many 
governments are thinking about climate 
change policies. First, they are looking at 
international cooperation well beyond the 
UN agreements. The second and more 
important aspect of the shift relates to 
domestic policies. Earlier, and especially 
before the Copenhagen conference in 
2009, the international negotiations were 
the impetus for domestic mitigation 
policies. Emissions reductions at 
home were needed, it was explained, 
to meet future commitments abroad. 
But the international negotiations are 
now much less the reference point for 
domestic mitigation policy. In the face of 
increasingly robust science, governments 
and businesses are thinking more – and 
for diverse reasons – about how they 
engage in the global transformation 
away from reliance on fossil fuels: in 
other words, how they ‘decarbonise’ their 
economies. South Korea, for example, 
has seen economic advantages for itself 
in clean technologies, and is host to the 
new Global Green Growth Institute.8 
Other factors, such as health and energy 
security concerns, push in the same 
direction, as is seen by China’s large 
deployment of renewable energies and 
action to cap emissions from fossil fuel 
electricity generation plants. 
The domestic aspect of this shift is 
not yet well reflected at government level 
in New Zealand, where the orientation of 
climate change policy remains ‘neither lead 
nor lag’ and ‘fair share’ (see, for example, 
Smith, 2011; Groser, 2014b).9 Such 
concepts are a signal about international 
burden-sharing, and give no sense of the 
long-term direction of domestic policy 
and the economy. There has been no 
comprehensive statement on climate 
change since the current government 
was re-elected (2011), certainly nothing 
comparable to US president Barack 
Obama’s June 2013 Climate Action Plan, 
which demonstrates a coherent approach 
across three components: emissions 
reduction, adaptation to climate change 
and leadership of international efforts 
(Executive Office of the President, 2013). 
It should be noted that, while the UN 
negotiations are no longer setting the 
pace, they are still a necessary part of the 
future solution on climate change, as the 
latest IPCC report confirms. Common 
rules for reporting and accounting of 
emissions are needed to underpin the 
whole climate regime. Internationally-
tabled commitments can provide the 
needed ‘stretch’ of mitigation ambition, 
and also ensure the effectiveness of 
contributions through other parts of the 
climate change regime, such as finance 
and technology transfer. 
 At home: the state of play of New Zealand 
climate change policy
In the absence of a strong national 
policy statement, most of the recent 
There has been no comprehensive statement on 
climate change since the current government was 
re-elected (2011), certainly nothing comparable to 
US president Barack Obama’s June 2013 Climate 
Action Plan ...
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government explanations on climate 
change have to be garnered from answers 
to parliamentary questions, speeches and 
op-eds. Taking the longer term first, New 
Zealand has a gazetted, non-binding, 
reviewable ‘responsibility target’10 of 
reducing emissions by 50% below 1990 
levels by 2050. This dates from 2011, and 
was depicted as meeting the ‘fair share’ 
criterion, comparable with the targets set 
by New Zealand’s major trading partners. 
Bundled together with the announcement 
of this target were elements of a broader, 
long-term orientation to come. Some 
other current measures were listed, and 
the recently-commissioned Green Growth 
Advisory Group was to provide further 
inputs into policies (Green Growth 
Advisory Group, 2011). 
Since its introduction in March 
2011, however, the 50/2050 target has 
received no official follow-up, and indeed 
is rarely even mentioned.11 It was not 
included in New Zealand’s list of policies 
in the Pacific Islands Forum’s Majuro 
Declaration in September 2013.12 Given 
that latest emissions projections are for 
an approximate doubling of emissions 
from the international reference point 
of 1990 levels, even with the use of 
markets achieving it would be a huge 
challenge. It would imply a much faster 
transformation of the New Zealand 
economy than anything contemplated so 
far. It is not clear whether this target is still 
officially considered achievable. If it is, it 
will be important to give some idea of 
the pathway to get there, with the policies 
and measures that would be used. 
The government continues to 
promote the emissions trading scheme 
(ETS) as the country’s primary climate 
change policy instrument, ‘one of the 
very best in the world’ in the words of 
one minister (Bridges, 2013b). There is 
bipartisan agreement of the two major 
political parties on an ETS as a core 
policy instrument, though increasing 
disagreement on its settings. The stated 
policy rationale of the ETS is as follows: 
The Government has chosen the New 
Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS) as its primary tool to reduce 
emissions, as it is the least-cost way 
of reducing emissions. The NZ 
ETS puts a price on emissions and 
therefore creates a financial incentive 
for all New Zealanders – especially 
businesses and consumers – to 
change our behaviour. The NZ ETS 
provides an incentive to: 
•	 reduce	emissions	
•	 invest	in	clean	technology	and	
renewable power generation, and 
•	 plant	trees.13 
In addition to these policy objectives, 
there are other claims, including that ‘the 
NZ ETS will strengthen the country’s 
clean green brand’. 
With its current settings and in the 
current international context, the ETS is 
doing none of these things,14 and indeed by 
2013–14 was probably encouraging more 
tree felling than tree planting. While from 
a pure accounting and compliance point 
of view a low price is simply a market 
issue, achieving these policy objectives 
is not. Similarly, in the farming context, 
the rewards for lower emissions practices 
being followed by some farmers are all 
the smaller in the absence of an effective 
carbon price. So the most important 
features of the ETS which should advance 
the long-term transformation of the New 
Zealand economy are prejudiced by the 
cheap carbon price, since they reduce 
incentives to close to zero. 
Since its original design – a world-
first, all-sector all-gases scheme – the ETS 
has been weakened by the continued non-
inclusion of agriculture and the softening 
of settings – for example, the continuation 
of the ‘one for two’ transitional measure15 
– compounded by the collapse in carbon 
prices. The fundamental design of the 
ETS is not the issue, with one exception. 
The 100% exposure to the international 
market has allowed the cheapest carbon 
units, of whatever quality, to enter the 
New Zealand system. Over 70% of the 
units surrendered in 2012 were ERUs 
(emission reduction units),16 and in all 
82% of the units that year were from 
offshore carbon markets. ERUs are 
certainly cheap: less than 10% of the 
price of the already low New Zealand 
units (NZUs). They are overwhelmingly 
of Russian and Ukrainian origin, and 
are of dubious environmental integrity, 
thus creating a potential risk to the New 
Zealand brand – so much so that there is 
anecdotal evidence that some businesses 
are opting not to use them.17
In the world of carbon markets the 
adage ‘a tonne is a tonne is a tonne’ does 
not hold. There is no single ‘international 
price’ because carbon is not a fully 
internationally traded single commodity, 
like milk powder. There is a wide range 
of prices, because neither all units nor all 
markets are comparable. In April 2014, 
for example, carbon prices in the main 
markets in Europe, the US and China 
were between $NZ5 and $12. Quality also 
varies, from units of high environmental 
integrity to those of an environmental 
equivalent of junk bonds. It is notable that 
in the first biennial report required by the 
UNFCCC the government is coy about 
the units in its registry, on the grounds 
that units held but not yet surrendered to 
the UNFCCC do not need to be disclosed 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2013a). 
The unconstrained access to interna-
tional carbon markets risks being incon-
sistent with the Kyoto Protocol, which 
states that use of flexibility mechanisms is 
to be ‘supplemental’ to domestic action.18 
This was never quantified as a percentage, 
but it was further specified in a decision 
that domestic action must be a ‘signifi-
cant element’ of the effort made by each 
Annex I party.19 This is consistent with 
the concept of a global transformation 
towards low-carbon economies rather 
than paying to pollute. A case could be 
made that New Zealand’s ETS failed this 
The rationale of carbon pricing in New Zealand is 
explained as: ‘we are committed to doing our fair 
share. That means working at not trying to have 
policy settings above the international price’
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supplementarity test during the first Kyo-
to commitment period. 
The rationale of carbon pricing in 
New Zealand is explained as: ‘we are 
committed to doing our fair share. That 
means working at not trying to have 
policy settings above the international 
price’ (Bridges, 2013a, emphasis added). 
A typical response to criticism of the low 
carbon price is as follows:
Markets go up; markets come down 
… I think it is extremely unlikely 
that in 27 years, carbon prices – 
which have got nothing to do with 
the New Zealand emissions trading 
scheme; they are all influenced by the 
international price – will be sitting 
around the current extraordinarily 
low levels. (Groser, 2014a)
The implication of these comments 
is that the rising international price 
will provide the incentive to reduce 
emissions. This suggests that the pace 
of New Zealand’s emissions reductions 
will be determined by the vagaries 
of international markets. Complete 
dependence on international markets 
was never the intention of the ETS, since 
it has built-in safeguards against a too-
high international price, through a price 
ceiling of $25 a tonne. What is lacking is a 
price floor as a domestic policy lever and 
a low-carbon transition tool consistent 
with the stated objectives of the scheme. 
As of the first quarter of 2014, New 
Zealand’s net accounting position under 
the Kyoto Protocol was using a price of 
30 cents a tonne, and NZUs were around 
$3.00. Foresters and iwi have asked for a 
price floor of $15. The government has 
rejected such ideas, arguing that at a time 
of economic fragility such measures would 
raise costs to New Zealand consumers. 
It could be argued that under the 
original design of the ETS, covering 
almost 100% of New Zealand emissions, 
it was appropriate to use it as a single 
instrument of climate change policy, 
neutral across all sectors. In this case, 
with a carbon price potentially through 
the whole economy, complementary 
measures would be less necessary. 
Contrast this with the EU ETS which 
covers only around 45% of EU emissions. 
But with the indefinite exclusion of 
agriculture – just under half of New 
Zealand’s emissions under the present 
accounting rules – this question is no 
longer relevant. The New Zealand ETS at 
around 54% does not cover much more 
of the economy than its EU counterpart. 
New Zealand’s ETS settings have 
created winners and losers: winners in 
the livestock sector, the most emissions-
intensive of agriculture; and losers in 
forestry, other less greenhouse gas-
intensive land sector uses, and also to 
some extent the rest of the economy, 
which has to bear the costs of the 46% 
of emissions that are outside the ETS 
but within New Zealand’s international 
target. The ETS settings have encouraged 
arbitrage – liquidating deforestation 
obligations at an insignificant price per 
tonne through purchasing ERUs, holding 
on to NZUs in the expectation that they 
will eventually increase in value, and 
converting to dairy with a consequent 
increase in emissions, which do not have 
to be paid for.20 This could be seen as a 
domestic form of the carbon leakage that 
the government argues will be the case 
internationally if New Zealand puts a 
price on emissions where other countries 
don’t.21
Under this combination of price 
factors and settings, the ETS appears 
to have led in the opposite direction to 
that of the intended policy, and is most 
likely to delay New Zealand’s transition 
to a low-carbon economy. Getting offside 
with the sector on which New Zealand 
is relying, in all scenarios, to meet 
future commitments on mitigation is 
unfortunate. This is the second time that 
foresters have been disaffected, the first 
being towards the start of Kyoto’s first 
commitment period, when many forests 
were felled owing to uncertainty and to 
avoid future liabilities. Planting picked 
up again as the government provided 
more certainty about the period 2008–12. 
Currently timber is profitable for foresters 
but carbon is not. While the government 
has blamed foresters for not reading the 
market better (Groser, 2014a), another 
specifically New Zealand dimension of 
the problem is the complaints from iwi 
who have lost an estimated $600 million 
value from the trees on land they were 
given in settlements under the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Turia, 2014).22
The latest ‘snapshot’ of greenhouse 
gas emissions and the Kyoto accounting 
position for 2008–12 shows both an 
increase in emissions, running at 25% 
above the 1990 level, and a net surplus 
under Kyoto owing to holdings of 
forestry and Kyoto units (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2014). In fact, the expected 
surplus is very close to the Kyoto units 
held (90 million). As in the first biennial 
report, there is no breakdown of these 
units. It is likely that many of these units 
will displace NZUs and New Zealand 
AAUs (assigned amount units), which 
can be carried over into the next period, 
whereas Kyoto’s flexibility mechanism 
units can’t. However, it is also clear 
from this report that emissions from 
agriculture (owing to dairy expansion) 
and transport are on a rising trend, partly 
offset by improvements in emissions 
intensity. This latter trend is a co-benefit, 
driven by improvements in production 
efficiency (Clark, Aspin and Reisinger, 
2014); it is not attributable to climate 
change policies or measures.
Overall, the availability of cheap 
units together with the other settings 
have taken away the ETS’s bite during 
the first commitment period, and the 
Overall, the availability of cheap units together 
with the other settings have taken away the ETS’s 
bite during the first commitment period, and the 
stockpiled NZUs/AAUs will reduce incentives for 
transformation during the next commitment period.
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stockpiled NZUs/AAUs will reduce 
incentives for transformation during 
the next commitment period. In this 
context it is notable that New Zealand’s 
partly government-sponsored premier 
annual primary industries conference 
in May 2014 focused largely on the goal 
of doubling the value of agriculture 
exports. There was no mention in the 
prospectus for the two-day programme 
of sustainability, future energy sources or 
climate change.23
For the sake of completeness, men-
tion should be made of other government 
policies and measures, which include 
sectoral measures in energy, energy effi-
ciency, housing and transport. A full list-
ing of these complementary measures is in 
New Zealand’s sixth national communica-
tion. These measures appear somewhat 
piecemeal and overall are not yet strongly 
coordinated or coherent with the ETS.
The absence of a long-term vision, 
or a meaningful carbon price, together 
with piecemeal complementary measures 
has created a policy vacuum which could 
delay New Zealand’s transformation, and 
make it harder to make an internationally 
credible contribution to global emissions 
reduction. It also potentially stifles low-
carbon investment, given that there are 
no clear signals to business. 
To help fill this vacuum some 
initiatives have sprung up outside or 
alongside government. The economic 
consultancy Motu is running a new 
research programme called Shaping New 
Zealand’s Low-Emission Future: making 
the NZ ETS effective.24 Business New 
Zealand has absorbed the functions of the 
moribund New Zealand Business Council 
for Sustainable Development, which 
has been merged with Business New 
Zealand’s Sustainable Business Forum and 
reconfigured into the Sustainable Business 
Council.25 The Sustainable Business 
Council is now working with business 
on climate change and sustainability. The 
private sector-led Pure Advantage group, 
while it has not attracted the bulk of 
mainstream business, strongly advocates 
the benefits to New Zealand of green 
growth.26 Meanwhile, opposition parties 
and environmental and youth NGOs 
continue to push for more government 
action on climate change. 
Achieving coherence
International and domestic policies are 
both internally incoherent and inconsis-
tent with each other. In order to regain co-
herence, and steer New Zealand through 
the coming global transformation, there 
are some obvious steps that can be taken.
First is a statement which shows 
a shift from compliance and burden-
minimisation to economic transforma-
tion. Rather than the present government 
line of waiting to see what the major 
players do, this could convey an informed 
vision of the place of the New Zealand 
economy in a lower-carbon world and 
how that transformation can be managed. 
It would logically focus on opportunities 
for New Zealand, and at the very least 
could put forward ‘no regrets’ pathways 
on which some progress could be made 
independently of the state of international 
action. An emphasis on the long-term 
orientation of this transformation rather 
than attempting to pick winners through 
a single prescription would be most 
effective. Such a long-term view may 
require revision of the 2050 target, and/
or some idea of a strategy to achieve it. 
The 2011 Green Growth Advisory 
Group report was a lost opportunity 
for policy coherence, since it has 
received no formal government 
response. The report contained a 
modest set of recommendations, but 
importantly endorsed the idea of the 
inevitable transformation towards low 
carbon growth.27 It covered broader 
sustainability issues beyond climate 
change, for example in recommending a 
‘conversation’ about mining. The global 
transformation to clean energy will not 
mean early extinction of fossil fuels, but 
it will be important to understand how 
future potential oil and gas exploitation 
will factor in. What assumptions should 
be made about the price of carbon, and 
about investment in carbon capture and 
storage or other technologies? Is there 
a risk of stranded assets? How can oil 
and gas exploitation avoid prejudicing 
the ‘clean, green’ brand? There is a 
polarisation of public discussion on this 
important issue, between groups seeing 
oil and gas exploration as an absolute 
evil and a government view in which 
climate change is ignored completely in 
predictions of economic benefit.  
Second, the fallacy of the ‘international 
price of carbon’ should be dealt to. This 
makes sense only when seen in narrow 
terms of compliance with international 
commitments as a financial operation. 
It is misleading to talk of this when 
there are constraints on demand for 
these units imposed by governments, 
and New Zealand is unique in having 
none. However, since New Zealand ETS 
participants have now lost their access 
to international units, the government 
may have to abandon its laissez-faire 
approach to the price of carbon in 
the period ahead. Linking with other 
emissions trading schemes could be 
one response, but would take time to 
negotiate. Auctioning of NZUs, which is 
already allowed for under the ETS, could 
easily be implemented. The advantage of 
auctioning is that the government has 
the scope to determine what price is best 
to meet the twin objectives of meeting 
international obligations and steering 
the economy through its low-carbon 
transition.
Third, New Zealand has the chance to 
advocate an approach to agriculture and 
the land sector that would take account 
of the special needs of food production 
A virtuous circle on agriculture might be achieved 
at home, with action to price or regulate nitrous 
oxide – the cumulative gas of the two principal 
agricultural ones – with benefits of both lower 
emissions and cleaner water.
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and food security, acknowledge the 
implications of the science regarding 
methane as a short-lifetime gas, and 
encourage optimum land use choices. 
This does not necessarily mean trying 
to renegotiate basic rules, but would 
certainly have the potential to recognise 
that agricultural methane makes a much 
smaller contribution to global warming 
than its current metric would suggest.28 
New Zealand should have high credibility 
here through its world-leading research 
on the mitigation of ruminant methane.
A virtuous circle on agriculture 
might be achieved at home, with action 
to price or regulate nitrous oxide – the 
cumulative gas of the two principal 
agricultural ones – with benefits of both 
lower emissions and cleaner water.29 An 
even-handed approach to the different 
players in the land sector which treated 
livestock farmers the same as foresters, 
orchardists and others, and took account 
of recreation and tourism values, would 
be valuable. Such an approach could 
secure recognition of the limits to 
New Zealand’s mitigation potential in 
international burden-sharing discussions, 
while providing an economically rational 
framework at home. 
The whole land sector is the most 
complex area of the UN rules, and 
achieving changes will be a challenge 
because the major players are not 
demandeurs here. It will require some 
solid research, and New Zealand will 
need allies among the major agriculture-
producing nations. At Warsaw in 2013 
Tim Groser launched the discussion 
by calling for a different approach to 
agriculture under the UNFCCC in order 
to bring developing countries on board 
on mitigation. New Zealand’s latest 
submission on land sector accounting 
(New Zealand Government 2013a) is in 
this regard rather general and sits on the 
fence on most key issues, suggesting that 
New Zealand thinking is not far advanced. 
Based on the experience of almost two 
decades of negotiations on LULUCF, there 
is very little time indeed left to negotiate 
rules in this highly complex area. 
Fourth, to provide an updated 
evidence base for policy the government 
could commission further research: 
for example, on the effects of different 
carbon prices or of internationally-
pledged reduction targets and mitigation 
options for New Zealand. This research 
could contribute to an update of New 
Zealand’s mitigation potential, and could 
inform the review of the ETS in 2015. 
Fifth, the government could re-
engage with stakeholders, some of whom 
are ahead of government in thinking 
long-term. The private sector could 
assist in assessing the policy implications 
of market and broader ‘brand’ factors. 
Local government, too, is an important 
stakeholder in climate change because it 
bears the responsibility for adaptation, on 
which it has been calling for more guidance 
from central government. A sense of long-
term direction from central government 
on both adaptation and mitigation would 
give some context for local government, 
supporting local autonomy without 
being over-prescriptive. While the main 
responsibility of local authorities is 
adaptation, some are also putting in place 
mitigation policies, as seen, for example 
in Auckland’s Energy Resilience and Low 
Carbon Action Plan (Auckland Council, 
2014). This is consistent with action being 
taken by major cities around the world. 
Sixth, a further opportunity for inputs 
into policy will be the expert review 
under the UNFCCC of New Zealand’s 
sixth national communication and first 
biennial report, which will lead to public 
and international scrutiny as well as the 
chance to judge how far New Zealand 
is leading or lagging. Although the new 
processes are untested, they should 
produce insights for government and 
stakeholders. 
Apart from the land sector, where 
innovative thinking and research 
are needed, none of this looks too 
complicated. Moving away from fossil-
fuelled energy is obvious; New Zealand 
has a head start here, as electricity 
generation is already 70% renewable 
and a realistic target exists to increase 
that to 90% by 2025. This transition is 
occurring even without a meaningful 
carbon price, so it can be assumed that 
it could be faster with one. Given New 
Zealand’s geography, transport stands out 
as a vulnerable sector where electric and 
biofuel-powered vehicles and expanded 
public transport have potential. Progress 
is being made on energy efficiency. On 
agriculture, no government is going to 
send the dairy industry out of business, 
but it should not be too difficult to 
determine how far the current model is 
sustainable in the long term, and what 
policy settings are needed, taking into 
account other possible land uses, in order 
to ensure the best economic as well as 
environmental outcomes.
Thus, the combination of better 
science, new international deadlines 
and increasing interest from domestic 
stakeholders is an opportunity to achieve 
both policy direction and coherence. 
There are choices to be made on the 
long-term policy direction, and on the 
consequent mix of price and regulatory 
measures that would best serve it. A 
renewed sense of direction at home, 
evidence-based policies, and a credible 
commitment to international efforts, 
including leadership in agriculture, looks 
like an achievable, coherent package that 
could be brought together during 2015. 
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